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In this paper, I present a dilemma for theorizing about the connection 
between phenomenality (the “what it’s like” character of mental states) and a 
particular form of cognitive awareness, i.e., cognitive accessibility. I will discuss 
the two horns of the dilemma separately. While I won’t try to resolve which horn 
of the dilemma we should take I will argue that whichever one we’ll take 
scientific evidence can’t play the role of the arbiter Either there is a conceptual 
connection between phenomenality and cognitive accessibility that implies a 
necessary connection, or there is no conceptual connection but then the empirical 
evidence will – for principled reasons – underdetermine the theory describing the 
exact nature of the connection.  
   
Before I get to exact nature of the difficulty let me explain some key 
terms. Then I will review a particular proposal (Ned Block 2007) as to how 
evidence bears on the question of the separability (and consequently distinctness) 
of phenomenality and accessibility.  
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Ned Block in a series of papers (Block, 1990, 1995, 2002 and 2007) has 
made a conceptual distinction between phenomenality and different shades of 
cognitive consciousness. Cognitive consciousness involves a mental state’s 
possessing a particular kind of representational content or a particular cognitive 
role. Block distinguishes among various kinds of cognitive consciousness. A 
mental state is self-conscious if it involves a first-person representation of one's 
self. It is reflectively conscious if one has a "higher order" thought about that state 
to the effect that one is in that state. A state is access conscious if it is made 
available to cognitive processing; more precisely, if it is broadcast (in the 
occurrent, rather than dispositional sense) for free use in reasoning and direct 
rational control of behavior. This notion is fairly straightforwardly based on 
Baars’ (1988, 1997) and Dehaene and Naccache 2001) notion of global 
workspace. A state is accessible when with the proper direction of attention the 
state can actually become accessed, like when we notice a humming noise that we 
have been hearing for a while. According to Block, when we say of some thought 
that it is conscious we might mean any of these aspects.1 In this paper I will be 
                                                 
1Subpersonal mental representations like, e.g., the representations posited 
in theorems of language processing (Chomsky 1975), vision (Marr 1982), etc., are 
unconscious in all of the above ways. Mental states posited by Freudian theory are 
not access conscious (access is available only with the help of your analyst)  but 
may be self conscious and reflectively conscious. It is not implausible that my 
cat’s mental states are access conscious but not self or reflectively conscious. 
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concerned with the last two concepts of cognitive consciousness: access  
consciousness and accessibility. 
Phenomenal consciousness, on the other hand, involves experiential 
quality, the “what it’s like” feature possessed by some mental states and 
processes. For example, when listening to, e.g., a Bartók string quartet, there are 
various auditory and other sensations, feelings of excitement, agitation and so 
forth that partly make up my experience. On any particular occasion, there is 
something it’s like to have these experiences. Phenomenal consciousness is a 
determinable - there being something it’s like -, with various kinds of 
determinates, i.e., the specific ways it is like. In the philosophical literature on 
consciousness these determinate kinds of phenomenal consciousness are called 
‘qualia’. There are qualia associated with the various senses, i.e., auditory qualia, 
visual qualia, etc., and also distinctive kinds of qualia associated with various 
emotions, reflective thinking, meditation and so forth.  
It is phenomenal, and not cognitive consciousness that comprises what 
David Chalmers calls the “Hard Problem” for science. The concept of cognitive 
consciousness is the concept of something that fulfills a certain role. It might take 
many years of painstaking research to figure out what neural configurations and 
processes play that role but in a sense the research project is straightforward. The 
situation is different with respect to phenomenal consciousness. Our notion of 
phenomenality is not a functional one and it is very hard to see how any 
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neurophysiological process can possibly be consciousness.  
In any case, a typical human conscious episode, say the pain a person 
experiences when she has a headache, involves both phenomenal and cognitive 
consciousness. There is the phenomenal feeling of the headache: there is 
something it’s like to have it. This feeling will typically involve different 
sensations and will change over time. The state is accessible and is often access 
conscious, since it may cause her to decide to take an aspirin, and sometimes also 
self and reflectively conscious since she will judge that she is experiencing a 
headache. 
 
1) The first horn: no conceptual connection between phenomenality and 
access, or accessibility 
If we assume – for the moment, without argument – that there is no 
conceptual connection between phenomenality and access, or accessibility it is 
still an open question what relationship they have. For all we have said so far, 
cognitive and phenomenal consciousness may be entirely separable or they can be 
metaphysically or nomologically linked. Block argues that cognitive and 
phenomenal consciousness can be pried apart and are not just two aspects of the 
same phenomenon. He claims that it is possible for a mental state to be, e.g., 
access conscious, or accessible, but not phenomenally conscious, and vice versa.  
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One of his arguments for the possibility of access without phenomenal 
consciousness involves blind sight. People with blind sight experience no visual 
sensations, still apparently can obtain information about their environments via 
vision. In such cases Block thinks it is plausible that there is at least partial access 
to visual information, but there is reason to think that it is not accompanied by 
phenomenal consciousness since the subjects report that they experience no visual 
sensations. 
Arguing for the existence of phenomenal consciousness without access or 
even accessibility is more difficult. There is a view – Block calls it epistemic 
correlationism – according to which the metaphysical relationship between these 
two is not scientifically tractable. While cognitive access is intrinsic to our 
knowledge of phenomenology, it might or might not be constitutive of the 
phenomenal facts themselves. According to the epistemic correlationist, there is 
no possible empirical evidence that could tell us one way or another. Block 2007 
aims to refute this view. Block’s thesis is that the issue of the relationship 
between phenomenal and access consciousness is an empirical one; and that 
moreover, the issue is approachable by the same empirical methods we employ in 
science in general. Block suggests that by looking at the relevant data, and 
employing the method of inference to the best explanation, we can already mount 
an argument for the specific thesis that access consciousness – and even 
accessibility – is not constitutively necessary for phenomenality.  
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Consider the following kind of experiment which provides crucial support 
for Block’s thesis. Following Sperling’s (1960) famous experiments, Landman et 
al. (2003) showed subjects eight rectangles in different orientations for half a 
second. The resulting experience e is phenomenal, according to introspective 
reports of subjects, but certainly not all of it is access conscious at the same time. 
After that brief exposure, subjects are only able to report on the precise 
orientation of up to four of these rectangles. Given the model of access 
consciousness assumed in Block’s paper as broadcasting of representations in a 
global workspace, this experiments show, to my mind conclusively, that access 
consciousness is not constitutively necessary for the phenomenality of the 
experience. This finding is further supported by the neurophysiological data 
Block cites, which show the neural implementation of sensory representations and 
the neural implementation of global access to be physically separate and 
independent from each other. 
These experiments, which compose the bulk of Block’s supporting 
evidence, however, do not show accessibility, as opposed to access, is not 
constitutively necessary for phenomenality. Notice that the above interpretation of 
these experiments crucially relies on the subjects’ introspective report of the 
phenomenality of their entire visual experience, including those aspects of the 
experience whose content is not access conscious. Introspective awareness of the 
phenomenality of the entire experience was part of the evidence in the Sperling 
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and Landman experiments for why access is not necessary for phenomenality. But 
these data leave room for the hypothesis that accessibility is constitutively 
necessary for phenomenality.  
Unlike the thesis Block (2007) has conclusively refuted (i.e., the thesis 
that access consciousness is constitutive of phenomenality), the Accessibility 
thesis – i.e., the thesis that accessibility is constitutive of phenomenality – seems a 
viable hypothesis. None of the data discussed by Block rule it out, or even make it 
implausible. But if the accessibility thesis is true, then some interesting 
consequences follow – for example, that despite suggestions to the contrary by 
Block (2007), activations in the “fusiform face area” of “visuo-spatial extinction” 
patients, or any other early visual state that is not accessible, could not be 
phenomenal.2 
The issue of epistemic correlationism can be raised anew with respect to the 
Accessibility thesis.  Is it the case that in time we might find empirical evidence 
that supports or refutes the thesis, or is it the case, as the epistemic correlationist 
claims, that we are not epistemically situated to ever find out? It might seem that 
the problem is a straightforwardly empirical one. Determine the natural kind that 
constitutes the neural basis of consciousness in uncontroversial cases of 
phenomenal consciousness and then determine whether those neural kinds are 
present in the case of, say, an inaccessible visual representation. An 
                                                 
2 Block (2011) keeps to discussing the relationship between cognitive access and phenomenality 
and refrains from advancing any thesis about the relationship of accessibility and phenomenality.  
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insurmountable problem seems to arise, however: should one include the 
machinery of accessibility that exists in the clear cases in the natural kind? The 
answer clearly depends on whether accessibility, is, as a matter of fact, part of 
phenomenality. But since this is the very question we are trying to answer, it looks 
like we are up against an epistemic blind alley.  
I want to advance an argument that this epistemic problem cannot be 
overcome. The point is simple. Can we have evidence for the presence of 
phenomenality that doesn’t involve introspection, a mark of accessibility? As far 
as attributing phenomenality (or the lack of it) to perceptual states that are outside 
of introspective awareness, there is a general issue that doesn’t seem to depend on 
the particular nature of evidence. As Block (2007) points out, the hope is that at 
some point we will have enough empirical evidence that we can make an 
inference to the best explanation. Take a representation r that one is not even 
accessible, e.g., one involved in early visual processing. According to this view, at 
some stage of empirical research it will either turn out that the hypothesis that 
accessibility is part of phenomenality fits better into an overall framework 
explaining the empirical data or it is the opposite. However, and that is where this 
line of thought founders, for any explanation that appeals to the 
physical/functional features of r in conjunction with its phenomenality, one can 
construct another explanation that merely appeals to its physical/functional 
properties. What does the work in the explanation is the physical/functional 
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properties of r; its phenomenality qua phenomenality – or lack thereof – doesn’t 
add anything to its causal profile (that holds whether you are a physicalist or a 
dualist). It is hard to see how appeal to the physical/functional properties + the 
phenomenality of r can be explanatorily superior to a mere appeal to is 
physical/functional properties. The reason for this has to do with the directness 
and non-functional nature of phenomenal concepts. Because we conceive of 
phenomenality in this way, the question of whether phenomenality can separate 
from accessibility seems especially ill-suited for scientific treatment. This I take it 
is the same issue that makes the hard problem hard in the first place.   
This is not the last word on the issue of the empirical tractability of the 
relationship between cognitive accessibility and phenomenality. Considerations of 
simplicity, for example, might come into play – however, at the present moment it 
is hard to think how such simplicity considerations can be decisive enough to 
adjudicate the issue. The ball is in the court of those who argue for empirical 
empirical tractability; not the other way around. David Chalmers (1997), e.g., 
thinks that even if cognitive accessibility is not conceptually necessary for 
phenomenality, there is a strong default assumption to the effect that 
phenomenality correlates with accessibility. Such a hypothesis might be simpler 
than the alternative – after all, I am aware of the phenomenality of only those 
experiences that I can access – but it seems this cannot be decisive evidence. Let’s 
suppose that phenomenality in fact can occur without awareness. If my argument 
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about the general problem of explanatory parity of the two hypothesis positing vs 
denying the phenomenality of some inaccessible perceptual state is correct, no 
evidence could be found that would unseat that hypothesis – even if it is wrong.  
The upshot of this is not that there isn’t an immense amount that cognitive 
neuro-science is going to teach us about phenomenality and accessibility. The 
point is that there is a peculiar sort of limitation of how much science can find out 
when it comes to the question of the relationship of phenomenality and 
accessibility.  
 
2. The second horn 
 
Now let me say something about the other horn of the dilemma. So far we have 
assumed that there is no conceptual connection between phenomenality and 
awareness. However, one might want to argue that accessibility is conceptually 
necessary for phenomenality. The idea is that one’s conceptual grasp on 
phenomenality involves accessibility not just in the obvious sense that accessing  
an experience is one’s only way of becoming aware of its phenomenality but 
rather in the sense that phenomenality is not conceivable in the absence of 
accessibility. One might immediately object that analytic functionalism, i.e., the 
view that phenomenal concepts are analyzable in functional terms, is implausible 
on a priori grounds. Our concepts of phenomenal character are not analytically 
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equivalent to functional concepts that ascribe a certain causal profile to mental 
states. However, though plausibly there are no analytically sufficient conditions 
for phenomenality in functional terms, it is much less clear that there are no 
analytically necessary conditions.  
The idea is that we don’t have a conception of phenomenal states that are 
inaccessible. Whereas I think (pace Berkeley) that one can have the concept 
TREE and the concept OBSERVED and understand what it is for something to 
fall under one but not the other, it is not clear that one can have the concept 
PHENOMENAL and the concept ACCESSIBLE and understand what it is for 
one to have a phenomenal experience that one is not accessible.  There is a 
paradoxical air to trying to conceive of a phenomenal state that is not accessible. 
You can, for example, imagine a tree that is not observed. Yet what would it even 
be to imagine a phenomenal experience that is not accessible?  
In any case, if this is correct, the science of consciousness would be in a better 
place, at least as far as the particular issue of finding the neural correlates for 
phenomenality goes – if only by virtue of eliminating the question about the 
possible separation between phenomenality and awareness.  
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